In the mid-1990s, the 50-seat regional jet promised enormous potential for expansion. Major U. S. airlines that used regional airlines to force their hubs used propeller-equipped aircraft, such as the Bombardier Dash-8 or ATR-42. The 50-seat regional jet, initially manufactured by Bombardier as a modification of its popular business jet, featured smoother flights, no middle seats, faster flights, and a perceived benefit advantage. Revenue models at the time estimated that consumers would pay more to travel on an airplane than on a turboprop. Added to this is the fact that airlines can use those planes for regional flights without violating their pilot contracts, and major U. S. airlines have placed orders for cargoes from Bombardier CRJ and its competitor Embraer. Shortly after delivering 50-seat aircraft, suppliers temporarily introduced 70- and 90-seat editions. A reduced edition was also made to just 35 seats, and American Airlines used it for short-haul flights along the East Coast.
Now, almost 30 years later, the world has changed. Airlines have learned the price of seat economy over travel, and fleet upgrades are popular across airlines. Pilots’ salaries have increased, and some airlines now have to pay them the same amount to bring in 50 more people to bring in another 150 people. The expected earnings premium never materialized consistently. These adjustments made it possible to cost-effectively deploy the 50-seat and smaller aircraft.
Regional jets are rarely thought of as aircraft with fewer than a hundred seats. Until the 1990s, they were all powered by turboprops. The planes were reliable, affordably operated, fairly fuel-efficient, and could operate only on short runways. This was vital because they were rarely unusual at small-town airports. When Bombardier created the CRJ, it was a game-changer, as it looked and functioned like a full-size aircraft, but at first only had 50 seats.
In the U. S. , pilot contracts have a scope clause. These clauses protect the union by restricting the capacity that can be rented through the airline that does not use pilots covered by the contract. Many of these scope clauses give giant airlines the option to outsource their flights. to regional carriers, as long as the aircraft are small enough. This reduction in diversity is the main explanation for why so many 50-seat aircraft were produced and deployed, and it also created a huge demand for the 70-seat aircraft. In the 1980s, airlines were still looking for smaller planes to fly locally to smaller cities. The U. S. order for the Fokker-100 in the early 1990s was in some ways the first order for regional jets, although it flew through the major carrier. That’s because at the time, it was an explanatory choice why for small aircraft.
Airplanes are getting bigger and bigger for a number of reasons. The applicable maximum charge metric for airlines is known as CASM, or charge consistent with available seat-mile. The “ASM” portion of this metric is calculated by multiplying the number of seats on an airplane through the number of miles flown. So, the more seats there are or the longer the trip, the more ASM. When dividing those ASMs by the charge of or consistent with the flight taken by the airline, a larger denominator means a smaller total number. This fundamental calculation means that larger aircraft have lower unit fares, and that’s why, to some extent, 50-seat aircraft were replaced by 70-seat aircraft, which were then replaced by 90-seat aircraft.
Access to major airports is another reason. Larger U. S. hubs, such as Atlanta, Chicapass, Dallas and Denver, are also very busy and have limitations. If a single plane carries 50 people, they still use time on the runways and taxiways. and park in a gate for a while. A 90-seat aircraft no longer uses physical resources and can use less if it flies faster. Therefore, a larger device is a way to be more effective in limited spaces. The Airbus A380 was an excessive We will try to solve this problem. Airbus bet that big cities like London, New York and Hong Kong would be so limited that having a large aircraft would be the way of the future. It hasn’t proven necessary yet, but when you go from 50 to 90 or more, the economy shows.
Flights of less than 8 hours require two pilots, regardless of the number of seats on the plane. The driver market has become very limited. The military, once a normal source of publicity for airline pilots, no longer provides a giant, solid pipeline. The 1,500-hour rule, a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulation passed in 2012, has made pilot education very expensive. For decades, pilots may simply sign up for an advertising airline with 250 hours of work and apprentice to an experienced captain as they gain experience. This formula was considered and is still used in the rest of the world.
Add to that the fact that the industry is constantly developing and you want an ever-developing group of pilots. As a result, pilot salaries are high and continue to grow. It’s tricky for airlines to make their flights financially successful if there are rarely enough staff. Profits can cover all costs, adding giant cabin builds. This means that giant jets are more cost-effective. A 90-seat aircraft can generate 80% more profit compared to a 50-seat aircraft, but it still only uses two pilots. Other operating costs, such as landing fees and fuel, are also rising well below 80%. But it’s pilot costs, across regions, that are driving most of the increase in the size of the devices.
Low-cost airlines are growing, whether in the U. S. or in the U. S. In the U. S. and around the world. Low-cost airlines get their prices low because they are undeniable and efficient. Since airline consumers are very elastic in value, meaning that with a slight drop in value, many more people buy the product, cheap airlines tend to use larger midsize jets and fill them with seats. In the 1980s, Southwest airlines played this game: the Boeing 737 to fly routes that larger airlines flew with their regional turboprop partners.
Today, airlines such as JetBlue, Spirit, Frontier and many others jointly offer a nationwide network and fares in all cities, even the smallest ones. This means that smaller aircraft, such as 50-seat jets, can’t generate higher profits, but they also can’t generate more profits. In the 1980s, Bob Crandall, CEO of American Airlines, said smaller planes were the solution. This was because they simply charged high fares and the extra seats put downward pressure on fares. Global, characterized by high prices for pilots and cheap operators everywhere, this strategy no longer works.
All those arguments are not solved by moving to 70- or even 90-seat facilities. The most effective narrow-body aircraft sold today is the Airbus A220, and the smallest model can carry 135 people. A large part of this aircraft was built on the Airbus A319. a shorter edition of the popular, economically obsolete A320. Given these realities, it’s hard not to expect that 70- and 90-seat regional jets will also disappear over time. Of course, it’s the 90-seat planes that will last the longest.
If this is true, it begs the question of what happens to regional airlines in the United States. Companies like Republic, Skywest, and Mesa employ thousands of people and attract a savvy portion of the traveling public. Major airlines employ them to fly because they are more profitable, whether in terms of hard work or in other areas. As the generation replaces others at airports and pilot salaries continue to rise, the role of the regional airline becomes suspect. Enjoy your next trip aboard a 70-seater aircraft, knowing that you are flying aboard an aircraft that is the mechanical edition of the dodo.