With 4,600 workers, Boeing Vertical’s headquarters is one of the last remnants of heavy industry in a region that has noticed a steady decline in its productive fortune. The plant spends more than $500 million a year to acquire portions and 473 suppliers in Keystone state, however, its long term as a local economic engine is in serious doubt.
On the one hand, the V-22 Osprey tilting rotor, for which the plant has built fuselages for more than 20 years, seems to be reaching the end of production. The company’s global marketing manager warned potential consumers last year that “we’re nearing the end of our referral programs.” Work on the V-22 is likely to decrease after 2023.
On the other hand, an update to the army’s CH-47 Chinook helicopter”, which Boeing personnel said would keep the plant running for the next 20 years, receives the bloodless shoulder of army leaders. They need to invest in aviation in two new helicopters and abandon efforts to repair the payload capacity of the army’s heaviest cargo plane.
Boeing (a contributor to my expert group) is competing to build one of those new army helicopters and expects new foreign consumers for Osprey and Chinook, yet Philadelphia plant customers have doubts at best, and this is a political story.
The funny thing about this scenario is that Pennsylvania, the fifth most populous state in the country, is at stake in the November election. In 2016, Donald Trump was the first Republican presidential nominee to bring Pennsylvania back since Ronald Reagan in 1988, and he didn’t use it much.
In fact, the winning presidential candidate in Pennsylvania almost never leads the state to more than 2% of the vote, making it a true undecided state. In addition, Boeing’s plant is located in a suburban belt around the state’s largest city, cited as an example of the kind of position in which Republicans want to build their support. The region had a democratic trend in mid-term elections.
So it’s a little hard to see why Boeing’s plant didn’t get the kind of attention from Trump agents who, for example, received the country’s top tank plant in Ohio. Local media reports that, directly and indirectly, Boeing’s site represents 16,000 jobs in Keystone state, and the demanding situations it will face in the coming years are largely due to decisions made at the Trump Pentagon.
The production of the V-22 is a good example. The manufacture of the revolutionary rotor swingarm mobile for joint force is intended to descend once a third multiannual contract ends around 2023. Boeing’s plant will continue to provide support to the V-22, adding 129 “B” modified variants to the new “C” configuration.
But standardizing the capacity of aircraft in service does not generate the type of meeting paints generated by mass production, nor would it do much to maintain the groups of engineers used. The Pentagon’s current plan is to close mass production of V-22s at the end of the multi-year era, as minimum needs for the air force, military and military users are met.
The word “minimum” applies here because there are several prospective V-22 programs that would be rejected if production ceased by the middle of the decade. These come with the use of the V-22 for anti-submarine missions, in-flight resupply of amphibious warships, airborne electronic warfare and combat search and rescue. The National Guard has also expressed interest in the V-22 in its crisis reaction role, but none of these missions will be addressed in existing plans.
Even the important missions for which the V-22 acquired through the Joint Force are not fully processed. The objective of maritime production does not take into account the wear and tear that can result from a primary war. The acquisition of the Air Force for special operations missions is slightly sufficient to comply with the prospective call (particularly in the combat and rescue search box), and the acquisition of military personnel for delivery on board aircraft carriers is just as tight. There are many reasons to buy dozens of more V-22s before final production.
The Army’s resolve to postpone updates to Block II of its Chinook CH-47 is equally disconcerting. Because lifting capacity has been lost due to self-protection projects (such as armor) brought in for more than two decades, Chinook will not be able to ship the army’s popular jeep or next-generation box howitzers unless upgraded to The Block II configuration. .
It probably wouldn’t matter if the army had a new heavy lifting device waiting behind the scenes, but in fact plans to continue using Chinook until 2060. The military says it doesn’t need to divert aviation investment from its next-generation vertical uprising efforts. However, the appors had no trouble locating other bill payers to keep Block II in the path of the 2020 and 2021 budget reviews. The army’s continued resistance to the improvement of the chinook is therefore difficult to understand.
As things stand, it is the Democrats who now dominate the local Congressional delegation on both sides of the Delaware River who have stepped in to keep Block II on the road. They would possibly look as social justice progressives to their critics, however, when it comes to protective work, they know that keeping Boeing staff in the paintings is a very sensible priority. They joined forces with local Republicans to open an Air Force helicopter festival, allowing Boeing to paint on a Leonardo mobile built in the region.
If the defense budget stops or decreases in the coming years, complicated options will have to be made in many army programs. But the stage on the floor right now at Boeing Vertical’s main plant near Philadelphia is that Democrats are doing their best for the paints to keep the lamps on. If the White House is doing something special to keep the plant viable for years to come, it’s not easy for foreigners.
I on the strategic, economic and advertising implications of defense spending as chief operating officer of the Lexington Institute and non-profit executive director
I focus on the strategic, economic and advertising implications of defense spending as chief operating officer of the Lexington Nonprofit Institute and chief executive officer of Source Associates. Prior to my current position, I was Deputy Director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University and taught graduate courses in strategy, generation and media businesses in Georgetown. I also taught at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government. I have a doctorate and a master’s degree in government from Georgetown University and a bachelor’s degree in political science from Northeastern University. Disclosure: The Lexington Institute receives investments from several of the country’s leading defense contractors, in addition to Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Raytheon and United Technologies.